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I. Introduction
The Dickey-Lincoln School Hydro Power Project was authorized 
by Congress in 1965. Advanced engineering and design work was then begun 
by the Army Corps of Engineering in early 1966. Further detailed design 
work was suspended in November, 1967 because .of Congress' failure to appro­
priate further funds for design or construction. However, it now appears 
likely that Congress will include funds for continued design and engineering 
work in its appropriations for fiscal year 1974-75.
Each year since 1967, the Corps has used indexes of construction 
costs and other price indexes in order to update the estimates of construction 
costs to reflect current cost and price conditions. The Corps has also 
revised and updated the estimates of hydro electric power benefits to 
reflect changing economic conditions. On the basis of the detailed 
analysis done prior to 1967 and the subsequent revisions, the Corps 
presently estimates that the ratio of total benefits to total costs for 
Dickey-Lincoln is 2.6. However, there are two major limitations to this 
estimate of a benefit-cost ratio. First is that the basic data and analysis 
underlying the benefit-cost ratio are now alomost seven years old, and 
the subsequent adjustments only imperfectly reflect changes in economic 
techniques and methods used to calculate the benefit-cost ratio are faulty 
in several important respects.
In this report, I will be able to deal only with problems of 
technique and methodology. The work reported below is also based upon the 
1967 data as revised and updated by the Corps of Engineers. However, 
this work does apply different techniques and methods which are considered
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to be correct by economists and shows that the consequence of applying 
correct techniques and methods leads to conclusions about the economic 
feasibility of the Dickey-Lincoln Project which are substantially different 
from those of the Corps of Engineers. Specifically, when appropriate 
techniques are used, the "true" benefit-cost ratio is shown to lie some­
where between 0.9 and 1.2 depending upon the assumptions made about key 
variables. The difference between . the high and low estimates of the 
benefit-cost ratio is small compared to the range of uncertainty and 
possible error stemming from the use of old and possibly outdated data.
There are three ways in which the techniques and methods used 
by the Corps tend to overstate the degree of economic feasibility of 
the Dickey-Lincoln Project. First, the techniques used to calaalate 
the benefits due to hydro electric power generation lead to overestimates 
of hydropower benefits. Second, the assumptions concerning the cost of 
capital used in construction of the project lead to a substantial 
underestimate of construction costs. nd third,not all of the true costs 
of the project construction are counted. Specifically, the benefit- 
cost analysis ignores the cost of environmental change and the losses of 
recreation, fish, and wildlife values associated with a freeflowing un­
developed river. If the Corps' benefit-cost analysis is corrected to take 
into account the first two points above, the revised benefit-cost ratio 
is reduced to somewhere between 0,9 and 1.2. Then, if due weight is given 
to the environmental damages , it appears that they would tip the scale 
against the project construction.
It must be emphasized that the findings reported in this paper 
are not definitive. If funds for further design work and study are authorized 
by Congress, the Corps of Engineers will be able to generate new and 
more up-to-date data and analysis on costs and benefits. In addition, 
the Corps will be required by law to prepare and circulate an environmental 
impact statement (EIS) "which will ensure that presently unquantified 
environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate consideration 
in decision making along with economic and technical considerations (National 
Environmental Policy Act of 1969)." The EIS must incorporate data on 
economic benefits and costs as well as environmental benefits and costs, 
and it must identify and evaluate alternative ways of meeting the project 
objectives. When the Corps' studies are completed and the EIS circulated,
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independcnt analysts and other parties of interest will have substantially 
more information for their debate about the merits of the project. Since 
these data are not presently available, the primary purpose of this report 
is to illustrate the importance of using correct analytical techniques and • 
procedures in evaluating benefits and costs, and to focus attention on the 
critical variables and components of the data.
The next section will outline the rationale for a benefit-cost 
analysis and the principles to be used for defining and measuring economic 
benefits and costs. Subsequent sections will review and critically evaluate 
the most recent benefit-cost analysis undertaken for the Corps of Engineers.
II. The Principles of Benefit-Cost Analysis
In the most general sense, benefit-cost analysis is simply the 
application of common sense —  no more, no less. It means that whenever one 
is confronted with a choice or a decision as to whether to undertake a course 
cf action, he should identify and list all of the beneficial or favorable 
consequences that will stem from taking that action and compare these with 
all of the possible adverse consequences or costs of taking that action. If 
the beneficial consequences are perceived to outweigh the adverse consequences, 
the action should be undertaken. At this level of generality the only alter­
natives to rational weighing of benefits and costs are the use of the 
essentially arbitrary decision making rules (for example, always say no) 
or random choices (for example, coin flipping).:
Benefit-cost analysis might best bo seen as a scale or balance 
where the benefits are piled on one tray, the costs are piled on the other 
and the purpose is to see which way the scales tip. However, this analogy 
points to one of the limitations to applying the rationale of benefit-cost 
analysis. The objective application of benefit-cost analysis to decision 
making requires that all of the benefits and the costs be expressed and 
measured in some common units , for example, weight in the case of the scales.
One of the major stated purposes of water resources development 
projects is; to increase the overall efficiency of the economic system in 
the use of resources such as labor, capital, and land in the production 
of goods and services. The appropriate scale or yardstick to apply to 
projects undertaken in the name of economic efficiency is dollar values. The
measure of the favorable effects of such a project would be the dollar 
value of the goods and services produced by the project where values are 
determined by or measured by the willingness to pay of individuals to 
receive these outputs. In many instances, the outputs of projects are not 
sold in markets, so that dollar value or willingness to pay is not regu­
larly observed or recorded. For example, an individual would be willing 
to pay something to use the road between his home and his workplace even 
though no tollboQth has been set up to exploit that willingness to pay.
In these cases willingness to pay and value must be estimated or inferred 
on the basis of other information. Part of the art of benefit-cost 
analysis is the development of these techniques for estimating values.
On the cost side, the appropriate measure is the value of other 
goods and services which must be foregone or given up in order to 
free the resources for utilization in this project. This is the notion 
of opportunity costs. For.example, if a certain project requires a 
year of work by a laborer, the cost is what that laborér would have 
produced elsewhere if he had not been utilized in this project. That 
is the opportunity cost of labor. In a market economy, the prices of 
resources such as labor, capital, and land are usually accurate measures 
of their opportunity cost. But for some resource inputs, market values 
are not available; hence opportunity costs must be estimated or inferred 
on the basis of other information.. For example, if a hydroelectric project 
" requires the damming of a free flowing river, one of the things that is 
lost or foregone in undertaking the project is the value of the recreation 
al, fish, wildlife, and other environmental services provided by the river 
in its natural state. While these values are not readily measurable 
in dollar terms, their loss is surely a cost which must be weighed against 
whatever benefits the project is supposed to bring.
Benefit-cost analysis can be a truly reliable guide to making 
• decisions on resource allocation only if all of the benefits and costs 
aré'identified, measured, and placed in dollar units so they can be 
weighed on the economist's scale. Clearly this is a counsel of perfection 
These conditions can never be met totally. No benefit-cost analysis
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can adequately identify and measure all of the relevant variables. This 
does not mean that benefit-cost analysis should be scrapped as a guide to 
decision making. But also .it does not mean that benefit-cost analysis 
should proceed by counting only those things for which dollar price 
tags are available and ignoring those favorable and adverse effects 
which cannot be readily expressed in dollar terms.
There is a middle ground which makes maximum use of the available 
information. This is first to provide an accounting of all the benefits 
and costs which can be expressed in dollar terms, and second, to. accom­
pany this with a description of and quantification of the other favorable 
and adverse effects which are expected to stem from the project."*" This 
listing permits persons involved in the decision making process to identify 
and assess the non-economic consequences of economic decisions.
While an adequate listing of the non-economic eonsequences of under­
taking the Dickey-Lincoln project is not yet possible, the National 
Environmental Policy Act is meant to ensure that this information is compiled 
and made available to persons involved in the decision making process.
III. The Corps' of Engineers Benefit-Cost Analysis
On the basis of the earlier design and engineering studies updated 
for changes in construction costs and prices over the last seven years, 
the Corps of Engineers estimates that the dam and associat d power 
facilities will cost $384,800,000 including interest during construction.
In addition, transmission facilities are expected to cost $129,100,000.
Half of the investment in transmission facilities is attributed by the 
Corps to the Dickey-Lincoln project, i.e., the Dickey-Lincoln share is 
$64,550,000. The total construction cost for the facilities in current 
dollars is estimated to be:
1. This is essentially what is called for by the Water Resources 
Council in "Principles and Standards for Planning Water and Related 
Land Resources." This is also consistent with the requirements of the 
National Environmental Policy Act.
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Investment in dams and 
generating equipment $384,800,000
Transmission facilities 64,550,000
Total investment $449,350,000
In most presentations of benefit-cost data, both the benefits
anc  ^the costs are expressed in terms of annual flows or dollars per 
year. This requires that the total investment incurred at the beginning 
of the project. The annual equivalent of investment costs can be 
interpreted as the amount required in equal annual installments to recoup 
the initial investment plus interest over the life of the project.
The Corps assumes that the Dickey-Lincoln dam will have a useful life of 
100 years. They assume that interest would be charged at the rate of 
3 1/4% per year. The annual costs used below are based upon these assump­
tions. The annual benefits and costs as calculated by the Corps of 
Engineers are as follows:
ANNUAL BENEFITS
The value of electric power 
Flood control damages avoided 
Recreation benefits 
Redevelopment benefits
PER YEAR
$44,365,000
60,000
1,250,000
817,000
Total annual benefits $46,492,000
ANNUAL COSTS
Annual equivalent of investment 
costs plus operation, main­
tenance and replacement 
100 years at 3 1/4% $17,742,000
BENEFIT TO COST RATIO 2 . 6
IV. Review and. Critique
There are three major criticisms to be made of the Corps' benefit- 
cost analysis. The first concerns the technique for estimating, hydro­
electric power benefits. The second is the assumption concerning the 
cost of capital of the interest rate used to.calculate annual project 
costs. And the third concerns the omission of the costs of environ­
mental changes.
If it can be.shown that the electrical energy to be produced 
by Dickey-Lincoln would be produced by some other source if Dickey- 
Lincoln were hot built, then the cost of producing electricial energy 
from the alternative can be used as a measure of benefits of Dickey- 
Lincoln power. This is because if Dickey-Lincoln were built, it would 
not be necessary to use labor, capital, and other resources in constructing 
and operating the alternative. That savings in resources as measured 
by the cost of the alternative is the benefit of using Dickey-Linooln 
to generate the electrical energy. .
The proper application of the;"cost of alternative" technique for 
estimating benefits requires both the identification of an appropriate 
alternative, and the correct measurement of the cost of that alternative.
The Corps of Engineers has assumed that in the absense of Dickey-Lincoln, 
a combination of oilfired steam base load equipment in Maine and gas turbine 
equipment in Boston would be the most likely alternative to meet existing 
and projected changes in the demand for electric energy.
The Corps can be criticized for not considering a wider range of 
alternatives both for providing increments to supply and for altering 
the patterns of demand. For example, a full investigation of the 
economic feasibility of Dickey-Lincoln as a source of peaking power for New 
England would require an investigation of the effect of peak load pricing 
on the load curve and the growth in electricity demand. If peak load 
users were charged something approaching the marginal costs they impose on 
the system, it is possible that changes in the time pattern of electricity 
demand would make additional investments in peaking capacity such as 
Dickey-Lincoln unnecessary. Also some less conventional supply alternatives
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should be investigated, including the recent suggestion that sustained 
yield management of the forestry area proposed to be-flooded by Dickey- 
Lincoln could produce enough wood fuel to support an equivalent sized 
steam generating facility at competitive cost, it is beyond the scope 
of this paper to analyze these alternatives. It should be noted, however, 
the Corps is required by law to investigate and evaluate the full range 
of alternatives as part of its environmental impact statement.
The proper measurement of the cost of the alternative requires 
an understanding of the distinction between real costs and financial 
costs. Real costs are the opportunity costs of the labor, capital, and 
other resources actually used in the construction and operation of the 
alternative. Financial costs are those money payments.that are recorded 
on the books of the constructing and operating agency. The real costs 
of a particular facility are independent of who constructs and operates 
that facility. But financial costs of a given facility can vary depending 
upon the identity of the operating agency. For example, if a privately 
owned utility company builds a generating facility, it must pay substantial 
amounts in realy property taxes to the local taxing authority. An 
identical facility owned and operated by a public agency will be tax 
exempt. The realy cost of the two facilities would be-the same, but the 
financial costs are different. It is the real costs of the alternative 
facility which are relevant as .a measure of the benefits of a hydro­
electric development such as Dickey-Lincoln. ' ■
The Corps assumed that the alternative to Dickey-Lincoln v/ould be 
privately owned. In calculating the cost of this alternative, the Corps 
included substantial amounts of federal and local taxes —  financial costs 
but not real resource costs. The Corps also included the cost of insur­
ance in its measure of cost of alternatives. This is legitimate in that 
insurance represents a cost of bearing the risk of possible accidental 
loss or damage. However, no comparable charge for. insurance was included 
in the cost estimates for Dickey-Lincoln. Since the alternatives must 
be evaluated on a comparable basis, either the insurance cost must be 
deducted from the cost of alternatives or an additional charge for insurance 
should be added to the cost of Dickey-Lincoln. The latter procedure is 
used below in a subsequent section where revised benefit-cost figures are
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presentecL
The cost of alternatives and therefore the estimates of hydro­
electric power benefits are quite sensitive to the assumptions made 
about the cost of fuel oil used in the alternative. The estimates 
used by the Corps in their most recent evaluation were made in 
January 1974 in.the.midst of great uncertainty about the future course 
of fuel oil prices. It is essential that the benefits estimates be 
revised to take into account the most recent data on fuel prices. And 
it. would be desirable to present alternative estimates of hydroelectiric 
benefits based on different assumptions about future oil prices.
.The interest rata or discount rate used to convert investment costs 
to annual equivalent costs may be the most important single variable 
in deteriming the benefit-cost ratio for very long-lived investments 
such as hydroelectric'dains. The interest rate represents . the opportunity 
cost to society of the capital used to build a project whiefi yields its 
benefits over a long period of time. The best measure of the cost of 
capital to society is the rate of return or interest that the capital 
could earn if placed in some alternative investment.
Most economists agree that the best measure of this opportunity 
cost is the rate of return on investment in the private sector of the 
economy. Although there is some disagreement as to the precise figure 
most economists would agree that this rate of return and the discount 
fate which should be used in benefit-cost analysis lie somewhere between 
8%. or ,10%.
r • ’ ■: . . .
Federal policy governing the choice of a discount rate for use in 
benefit-cost analysis has been a major source of political controversey.
A high discount rate used in project analysis ieads to high estimates 
of project costs and low benefit-cost ratios. The choice of low discount 
rates has the opposite effect. Federal policy established in 1962 based 
the discount rate on the coupon interest rate of outstanding long term 
U.S. Treasury securities (Senate Document 97). Because of a technicality of 
federal law ., the only long term government securities outstanding during
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the 60's were issued during the late 1940's and earlier. Because of 
the unusual money market conditions of the time, all of these securities 
carried unusually low coupon rates. As a consequence the discount 
rate used in evaluating projects during the 60's, including Dickey- 
Lincoln, reflected the unusual money market conditons of twenty years 
before and bore ;no relationship to current money market conditons or 
opportunity; costs of capital.
This.situation would have been .substantially corrected if the 
Proposed Principles and Standards for Planning . Water and Related 
Land Resources ratified by President Nixon in September, 1973, the 
Water Resources Council retreated to the position that "the govern­
ment's investment decisions are related to the cost of federal borrow­
ing," and established the discount rate for the evaluation of new projects 
at 6 7/8% (Water Resources Council, 1973,, PP. 34784, 24822).
Even this retreat was not enough for Congress. The Water 
Resources Development Act of 1974 further lowers the discount rate
to be used in evaluating projects which have not yet been authorized
s' ' .by Congress.; The Act also includes the so called "grandfather clause"
which requires that all subsequent evaluations of projects which have
once been authorized by Congress be analyzed using the discount rate in
force at the time of Congressional authorization^ Since Dickey-Lincoln
was authorized in 1965 under the old policy, the discount rate to be used
for current evaluation and analysis must still be the outdated and
quite unrealistic 3 1/4%.
As will be shown below, if the discount rate of 6 7/8% recommended
by the Water Resources Council is used, and other appropriate adjustments
are made, Dickey-Lincoln is only marginally justifiable on narrow
economic grounds. Higher discount rates push the benefit-cost ratio
below one. And if a 10% discount rate reflecting the true opportunity
cost of capital is used, the project would be clearly unjustifiable
2on economic grounds alone.
2. Since one of the real costs of construction is interest during 
construction, use of a higher discount rate would also mean a higher total 
investment. The results reported below do not include this adjustment.
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The third major criticism of the Corps' benefit-cost ratio is 
its failure to reflect all of the opportunity costs of constructing the 
dam and in particular the opportunity cost of diverting a free flowing 
river and its associated wildlands and forests to hydrological stoarage 
purposes. As was argued above, it is essential that even those costs which 
cannot be valued in monetary terms must be identified and quantified 
where possible so that decision makers can be aware of them and weigh 
and assess them in relation to the measured economic benefits in their 
dollar dimension. The Corps of Engineers will be compelled to provide 
information of this kind as part of their project evaluation when they 
draw up an environmental impact statement for Dickey-Lincoln.
In addition to the three major criticisms raised above, there are 
several points to be made concerning the other components of beneifts 
estimated by the Corps. The Corps estimates $60,000 per year in flood 
control benefits. These benefits are measured by the expected value 
of flood damages avoided by the construction of the dam. This is an 
appropriate'measure of flood control benefits provided that the dam 
structure is the least costly method for preventing the economic damage 
to the flood threatened areas. However, if alternative flood damag2 
prevention measures can provide equivalent protection at a cost of 
less than $60,000 per year, then the cost of the alternative is the 
appropriate measure of flood control benefits. As part of its project 
analysis and environmental impact statement, the Corps will have to 
consider alternative means of providing the flood protection to Fort 
Kent and neighboring areas. •'
The second largest class of benefits identified and measured by 
the Corps is recreation opportunities on the lake. The Corps estimates 
an average use of approximately 833,300 recreation-days over the life 
of the project. They assume a value per recreation-day of $1.50 yielding 
total recreation benefits of $1,250,000 per year (Corps of Engineers 
Letter dated April 26, 1974).
It is difficult to know what to make of this estimate. There are 
analytical techniques for predicting future recreation use at potential 
sites. But it is unclear whether the Corps used any of these techniques
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in arriving at their projected figure for use. In the absence of any
documentation, for their estimate, it is difficult to take it at face
value. Given the distance of the site from major population centers,
the low population of the immediate area, the relatively low quality of
the recreation experience to be provided, and the availability of many .
superior quality, locations for flatwater recreation within the state,
it seems likely that the 833,300 recreation-days per year is a sub-
3stantial overestimate of recreation use.
Also the unit value assigned by the Corps requires further examination. 
There are analytical techniques for estimating a willingness to pay per user 
day on the part of individual recreationists. However, these techniques are 
difficult and time consuming to apply to individual sites. As a substitute 
the Water Resources Council "Principles and Standards" authorized 
project analysts to assign a unit value to general recreation experiences of 
between $0.75 ;—  2.25 (Water Resources Council, 1973, p. 24804). The 
choice of value within that range is to be made on the basis of th'. quality 
of the site which would include distance and accessibility) and availability 
of substitute or alternative recreation sites. In the case of the Dickey- 
Lincoln lake , these considerations would appear to argue for a unit 
value toward the lower end of the range.
Finally the Corps counts as redevelopment benefits a portion of 
the wages to be paid for constructing the project and during early years 
of operation, arguing that some of these wages will go to workers,presently 
unemployed or underemployed within the project area. The logic of the argu­
ment is acceptable. The opportunity cost of utilizing a presently 
unemployed worker in the construction of the dam is zero. This fact can 
be reflected either by a downward adjustment of estimated construction costs, 
or by assigning an offsetting benefit of wages to unemployed workers.
However, the estimates of the numbers of unemployed and underemployed 
workers available for the project were based on labor market surveys done 
seven or eight years ago. The corps will have to make a new survey to 
determine the present labor market conditicr.3 in this area. ■ Furthermore 
the logic of the argument also compels us to look for possible offsetting
3. Since isolated numbers are difficult to interpret without some 
frame of reference for comparison, the following figures are provided 
to put the Corps' estimate in perspective. The visitor-days at Acadia Nat'l 
Park in 1970 totalled 2,300,000; while visitor-days along the Allagash 
Waterway for the same year were only 37,000.
adverse employment effects in the region. For example, if flooding of forest 
land causes a reduction in employment in the wood products industries, 
there may be offsetting unemployment effects which should be counted 
against the redevelopment benefits. If some workers in the wood products 
industries experience prolonged periods of unemployment, i.e., if they 
are unable to move quickly into alternative employment, then the net 
effect of the project on unemployment in the region would be smaller than 
estimated by the Corps. And accordingly redevelopment benefits would 
be reduced.
■ V; Revising the Cost-Benefit Ratio
In this section some of the major adjustments to the Corps of 
Engineers figures that hre discussed above are made and the results 
summarized. The critical variable in the benefit-cost analysis is the 
discount rate used as an estimate of capital cost. In this section I 
will present the revised benefit-cost ratios under two alternative assum­
ptions: the first being a dsicount rate of 5 7/3% as recommended in the
"Proposed Principles and Standards" of the Water Resources Council; and 
the second being a discount rate of 8 3/4% which the Federal Power Commission 
estimates as the cost of capital to the private utility industry. The 
8 3/4% discount rate is used here primarily because of the ready 
availability of data o;f the cost of alternative electricity supplies 
based on this discount rate.
At a discount rate of 6 7/8% and an estimated project life of 
100 years, the annual equivalent of construction costs and operating, 
maintenance, and replacement costs is $33,349,000. The Federal Power 
Commission has provided comparable estimates of the cost of alternative 
sources of electrical energy also based on a discount rate of 6 7/8%
(Federal Power Commission Letter), January 29, 1974). These cost 
estimates do not include taxes or insurance for the private alternatives; 
so they are strictly comparable with the estimate of- the cost of the 
hydroelectric project. The hydropower benefits based on the cost of 
the alternative are $37,304,000. The ratio of hydro power benefits 
alone to total project costs is 1.12.
We lack an empirical basis for revising the Corps' estimate of 
recreation, flood control and redevelopment benefits. However, it seems 
more likely that these are overestimates of the true value rather than 
underestimates. However, utilizing the Corps' estimates of these other
benefits, the benefit-cost situation can be summarized as follows:
ANNUAL BENEFITS PER YEAR
Hydro Power benefits $37,304,000
Recreation benefits 1,250,000
Flood Control 60,000
Redevelopment . : 817,000
Total annual benefits $39,431,000
ANNUAL COSTS
Additional costs of environmental
damages (value unknown)
BENEFIT TO COST RATIO less than 1.18
When the 8 3/4% discount rate is used, the annual equivalent of
4costs is equal to $42,192,000. The Federal Power Ccmmssion has also 
estimated the costs of providing alternative, power with an assumed cost 
of capital of 8 3/4%. The FPC's estimate included the cost of taxes.
Their estimate of the cost of alternative is $43,802,000 (Federal Power 
Commission Letter, January 29, 1974). In order to make this figure 
comparable with the cost of the hydro electric development, ,it is necessary 
to deduct the financial cost of taxes from this estimate. The data to 
make a precise determination are not available. However, the data in
Federal Power Commission Hydro Electric Power Evaluation make it possible
5 •to make an approximate adjustment. The cost of alternative power,
net of charges for taxes, was calculated to be $39,747,000. Adding the
Corps' estimates of flood control, recreation, and redevelopment benefits
yields the following summary tables:
4. This includes $449,000 per year for insurance as recommended by 
the Federal Power Commission. See Federal Power Commission, 1968, p.80.
5. . Table 50 shows that perhaps over a third of the capacity cost of 
the coal fired alternative is due to charges for federal, state and local 
taxes. To be conservative, it was assumed here that one quarter of the 
capacity charges for the gas turbine and oil fired systems were due to 
charges for taxes.
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ANNUAL BENEFITS
Hydro Electric power benefits 
Recreation benefits 
Flood control 
Redevelopment
Total annual benefits 
ANNUAL COSTS
Additional costs of environmental 
damages
BENEFIT TO COST RATIO
To summarize, in this section we have adjusted the estimates 
of benefits and costs provided by the Corps to take into account the 
proper procedure for defining and-measuring the benefits of hydro 
power development and to reflect more accurately the opportunity cost 
of capital. Under assumptions most favorable to the project, i.e., 
a 6 7/8% discount rate and zero environmental damages, the ratio 
of be refits to costs is approximately 1.2. This is clearly an upper 
bound estimate. The true figure would be less than this if the 
environmental costs of the project could be included.
Under the more realistic assumption of an 8 3/4% discount rate, 
the upper bound estimate of the ratio of benefits to costs is 0.99.
Taking into account the environmental damages and the possible over­
statement of recreation benefits simply reinforces the conclusion that the 
project is not economically justifiable at this discount rate. And at 
a 10% discount rate, the benefit-cost ratio would be substantially below 
1.0.
The economic case for the Dickey-Lincoln project is hardly over­
whelming. In fact even under the most favorable assumptions, the 
excess of benefits over costs is small compared to the possible errors 
in the magnitudes of all variables due to a reliance on outdated data 
and estimates from the 1966 and 1967 studies by the Corps. This suggests 
the need not only for further study, but also great caution before large 
committments of environmental and economic resources are made.
PER YEAR
$39,747,000
1,250,000
60,000
817,000
$41,874,000
(value unknown)
less than 0.99
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